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Offensive​ ​Explosion:​ ​An​ ​Analysis​ ​of​ ​Trends​ ​in​ ​Hitting​ ​Production​ ​in 
Major​ ​League​ ​Baseball 
By​ ​Laura​ ​Schreck​ ​&​ ​Eric​ ​Sickles 
  
 Abstract 
2014​ ​was​ ​a​ ​record​ ​year​ ​for​ ​pitchers​ ​followed​ ​by​ ​an​ ​abrupt​ ​reversal​ ​in​ ​trends​ ​with 
offensive​ ​numbers​ ​increasing​ ​steadily​ ​in​ ​2015​ ​and​ ​2016,​ ​culminating​ ​with​ ​a​ ​record-setting​ ​year 
for​ ​hitters​ ​in​ ​2017.​ ​This​ ​article​ ​explores​ ​similar​ ​offensive​ ​explosions​ ​throughout​ ​the​ ​history​ ​of 
Major​ ​League​ ​Baseball​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​draw​ ​parallels​ ​to​ ​the​ ​current​ ​extraordinary​ ​increase​ ​in​ ​offense. 
Evidence​ ​of​ ​this​ ​increase​ ​is​ ​provided​ ​by​ ​analyzing​ ​the​ ​trends​ ​of​ ​ten​ ​separate​ ​statistical​ ​categories, 
as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​the​ ​statistical​ ​trends​ ​of​ ​the​ ​top​ ​forty​ ​hitters,​ ​and​ ​twenty​ ​pitchers​ ​in​ ​Major​ ​League 
Baseball.​ ​This​ ​analysis​ ​and​ ​research​ ​provides​ ​the​ ​context​ ​for​ ​discussing​ ​possible​ ​reasons​ ​for​ ​such 
a​ ​profound​ ​offensive​ ​explosion;​ ​from​ ​steroid​ ​use​ ​to​ ​possibly​ ​tampering​ ​with​ ​the​ ​manufacturing 
of​ ​the​ ​baseball​ ​itself,​ ​this​ ​article​ ​discusses​ ​the​ ​implications​ ​of​ ​a​ ​dramatically​ ​changing​ ​baseball 
landscape​ ​where​ ​offense​ ​reigns​ ​supreme. 
Introduction 
1968​ ​was​ ​considered​ ​the​ ​“year​ ​of​ ​the​ ​pitcher,”because​ ​of​​ ​a​ ​league-wide​ ​statistics​ ​for 
batting​ ​average​ ​(AVG),​ ​on-base​ ​percentage​ ​(OPS),​ ​home​ ​runs​ ​per​ ​game​ ​(HR/G),​ ​earned​ ​run 
average​ ​(ERA),​ ​walks​ ​and​ ​hits​ ​per​ ​inning​ ​pitched​ ​(WHIP),​ ​and​ ​bases​ ​on​ ​balls​ ​per​ ​game​ ​(BB/G) 
the​ ​had​ ​never​ ​been​ ​as​ ​low.​ ​Forty-six​ ​years​ ​later,​ ​baseball​ ​pundits​ ​lauded​ ​2014​ ​as​ ​a​ ​second 
coming​ ​as​ ​offensive​ ​stats​ ​returned​ ​to​ ​the​ ​abysmal​ ​level​ ​of​ ​those​ ​in​ ​1968;​ ​pitchers​ ​once​ ​again 
claimed​ ​the​ ​year.​ ​The​ ​glaring​ ​difference​ ​between​ ​1968​ ​and​ ​2014​ ​however,​ ​is​ ​that​ ​the​ ​original 
year​ ​of​ ​the​ ​pitcher​ ​in​ ​1968​ ​was​ ​intrinsically​ ​anomalous.​ ​In​ ​other​ ​words,​ ​there​ ​was​ ​no​ ​significant 
trend​ ​that​ ​would​ ​lead​ ​one​ ​to​ ​infer​ ​such​ ​a​ ​dramatically​ ​favorable​ ​year​ ​for​ ​pitchers.​ ​In​ ​1969, 
 statistics​ ​generally​ ​returned​ ​to​ ​a​ ​level​ ​more​ ​reflective​ ​of​ ​those​ ​and​ ​1967​ ​and​ ​before.​ ​The​ ​cause 
may​ ​have​ ​been​ ​the​ ​MLB​ ​making​ ​the​ ​decision​ ​to​ ​lower​ ​the​ ​mound​ ​height​ ​to​ ​the​ ​contemporary​ ​ten 
inches.​ ​On​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​clearly​ ​a​ ​pitcher​ ​friendly​ ​trend​ ​in​ ​the​ ​leading​ ​years​ ​that​ ​hits​ ​its 
apex​ ​of​ ​pitcher​ ​dominance​ ​in​ ​2014.​ ​​Indeed,​ ​data​ ​from​ ​the​ ​past​ ​ten​ ​years​ ​show​ ​a​ ​trend​ ​that​ ​favors 
pitchers​ ​in​ ​several​ ​different​ ​measures​ ​of​ ​pitcher​ ​efficiency​ ​–​ ​batting​ ​average​ ​(AVG),​ ​earned​ ​run 
average​ ​(ERA),​ ​home​ ​runs​ ​allowed​ ​(HR),​ ​walks​ ​and​ ​hits​ ​per​ ​innings​ ​pitched​ ​(WHIP),​ ​on​ ​base 
plus​ ​slugging​ ​percentage​ ​(OPS),​ ​bases​ ​on​ ​balls​ ​per​ ​game​ ​(BB/G),​ ​and​ ​runs​ ​per​ ​game​ ​(R/G). 
This​ ​begs​ ​the​ ​question:​ ​What​ ​can​ ​account​ ​for​ ​the​ ​the​ ​trends​ ​that​ ​favors​ ​the​ ​pitcher​ ​up​ ​to 
2014​ ​and​ ​its​ ​abrupt​ ​reversal​ ​in​ ​2015?​ ​Notably,​ ​Robert​ ​Manfred​ ​became​ ​Commissioner​ ​in​ ​2015 
and​ ​baseballs​ ​used​ ​in​ ​Major​ ​League​ ​games​ ​and​ ​manufactured​ ​by​ ​Rawlings​ ​needed​ ​to​ ​be 
redesigned​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​accommodate​ ​his​ ​signature.​ ​This​ ​redesign​ ​was​ ​not​ ​intended​ ​to​ ​otherwise 
alter​ ​the​ ​ball,​ ​yet​ ​still,​ ​Manfred​ ​joked,​ ​“Actually,​ ​if​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​surge​ ​in​ ​offense,​ ​we’ll​ ​all​ ​be 
happy”​ ​(Waldstein,​ ​2015).​ ​​ ​Manfred’s​ ​wish​ ​was​ ​manifested​ ​in​ ​the​ ​2015,​ ​2016,​ ​and​ ​2017​ ​seasons. 
As​ ​the​ ​2017​ ​season​ ​set​ ​record​ ​offensive​ ​numbers​ ​raising​ ​additional​ ​questions​ ​about​ ​the​ ​baseballs, 
pitcher​ ​Justin​ ​Verlander​ ​stated,​ ​“​I​ ​know​ ​Mr.​ ​Manfred​ ​said​ ​the​ ​balls​ ​haven’t​ ​changed,​ ​but​ ​I​ ​think 
there’s​ ​enough​ ​information​ ​out​ ​there​ ​to​ ​say​ ​that’s​ ​not​ ​true.​ ​Whether​ ​he​ ​has​ ​the​ ​say-so​ ​or​ ​not,​ ​I 
don’t​ ​know”​ ​(Kernan,​ ​2017). 
 
Literature​ ​Review 
Despite​ ​Commissioner​ ​Manfred​ ​“joking”​ ​about​ ​a​ ​surge​ ​in​ ​offense,​ ​MLB​ ​executives​ ​have 
had​ ​the​ ​goal​ ​of​ ​increasing​ ​offensive​ ​output​ ​since​ ​the​ ​game's​ ​infancy.​ ​Green​ ​(2011)​ ​describes 
professional​ ​baseball​ ​executives’​ ​first​ ​efforts​ ​at​ ​increasing​ ​offensive​ ​production.​ ​In​ ​1884,​ ​the 
 Chicago​ ​White​ ​Stockings​ ​played​ ​at​ ​Lake​ ​Front​ ​Park​ ​where​ ​the​ ​fences​ ​were​ ​just​ ​under​ ​200​ ​feet 
from​ ​home​ ​plate.​ ​As​ ​if​ ​playing​ ​in​ ​a​ ​park​ ​smaller​ ​than​ ​a​ ​standard​ ​Little​ ​League​ ​field​ ​wasn’t 
enough​ ​to​ ​substantially​ ​increase​ ​power​ ​statistics,​ ​the​ ​organization​ ​made​ ​the​ ​decision​ ​to​ ​count 
balls​ ​hit​ ​over​ ​the​ ​fence​ ​as​ ​home​ ​runs​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​doubles.​ ​This​ ​resulted​ ​in​ ​tripling​ ​the​ ​number​ ​of 
home​ ​runs​ ​from​ ​the​ ​previous​ ​year.​ ​From​ ​this​ ​point​ ​on,​ ​home​ ​runs​ ​would​ ​increase​ ​consistently 
until​ ​their​ ​19th​ ​century​ ​peak​ ​of​ ​760​ ​home​ ​runs​ ​in​ ​1890​ ​(Green,​ ​2011).  
Perhaps​ ​the​ ​most​ ​comprehensive​ ​research​ ​done​ ​on​ ​the​ ​topic​ ​of​ ​offensive​ ​potency​ ​in 
professional​ ​baseball​ ​was​ ​done​ ​by​ ​David​ ​Vincent​ ​in​ ​his​ ​book​ ​​Home​ ​Run:​ ​The​ ​Definitive​ ​History 
of​ ​Baseball’s​ ​Ultimate​ ​Weapon.​ ​​In​ ​Vincent’s​ ​work,​ ​he​ ​outlines​ ​the​ ​effect​ ​of​ ​several​ ​rule​ ​changes 
in​ ​the​ ​1920’s​ ​that​ ​greatly​ ​impact​ ​offensive​ ​production.​​ ​​The​ ​19th​ ​century,​ ​affectionately​ ​referred 
to​ ​as​ ​the​ ​“Dead​ ​Ball​ ​Era,”​ ​ended​ ​with​ ​Roger​ ​Conner​ ​atop​ ​the​ ​career​ ​leaders​ ​in​ ​home​ ​runs​ ​with 
just​ ​138.​ ​Despite​ ​this,​ ​prior​ ​to​ ​the​ ​1920​ ​season,​ ​league-wide​ ​home​ ​run​ ​production​ ​had​ ​been 
significantly​ ​lower​ ​than​ ​home​ ​run​ ​production​ ​in​ ​the​ ​prior​ ​century.​ ​This​ ​led​ ​to​ ​three​ ​rule​ ​changes 
before​ ​the​ ​1920​ ​season​ ​that​ ​aimed​ ​to​ ​increase​ ​offensive​ ​production​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​balance​ ​out​ ​the 
dominance​ ​of​ ​“dead​ ​ball”​ ​pitching​ ​and​ ​defense.​ ​The​ ​first​ ​of​ ​these​ ​rules​ ​was​ ​judging​ ​whether​ ​a 
home​ ​run​ ​was​ ​fair​ ​or​ ​foul​ ​not​ ​by​ ​where​ ​the​ ​ball​ ​landed,​ ​but​ ​by​ ​where​ ​it​ ​crossed​ ​over​ ​the​ ​fence. 
This​ ​revolutionary​ ​rule​ ​did​ ​not​ ​last​ ​long​ ​however,​ ​on​ ​June​ ​25,​ ​1920,​ ​with​ ​under​ ​60​ ​games​ ​played, 
the​ ​rule​ ​was​ ​changed​ ​back​ ​to​ ​its​ ​1919​ ​version,​ ​thus​ ​returning​ ​the​ ​judgement​ ​of​ ​a​ ​home​ ​run​ ​by 
where​ ​it​ ​“disappears​ ​from​ ​view”​ ​(Vincent,​ ​2006).​ ​The​ ​rule​ ​would​ ​not​ ​return​ ​again​ ​to​ ​its​ ​present 
form​ ​until​ ​1928.  
The​ ​second​ ​rule​ ​change​ ​affected​ ​the​ ​way​ ​that​ ​walk-off​ ​home​ ​runs​ ​were​ ​scored. 
Previously,​ ​only​ ​the​ ​number​ ​of​ ​bases​ ​needed​ ​to​ ​score​ ​a​ ​run​ ​would​ ​be​ ​awarded.​ ​​In​ ​other​ ​words,​ ​if 
 the​ ​game​ ​was​ ​tied​ ​and​ ​a​ ​runner​ ​was​ ​on​ ​second​ ​base,​ ​a​ ​ball​ ​hit​ ​out​ ​of​ ​the​ ​park​ ​became​ ​a​ ​double, 
since,​ ​when​ ​the​ ​runner​ ​on​ ​second​ ​scored,​ ​the​ ​game​ ​ended​ ​(Vincent​ ​2006).​ ​This​ ​new​ ​rule​ ​allowed 
walk-off​ ​home​ ​runs​ ​to​ ​be​ ​scored​ ​as​ ​such.​ ​Interestingly​ ​though,​ ​Babe​ ​Ruth​ ​is​ ​the​ ​only​ ​player​ ​that 
hit​ ​a​ ​would​ ​be​ ​walk​ ​off​ ​home​ ​run​ ​prior​ ​to​ ​1920,​ ​and​ ​also​ ​hit​ ​one​ ​in​ ​1920.  
The​ ​third,​ ​and​ ​perhaps,​ ​most​ ​hitter​ ​friendly​ ​rule​ ​change​ ​in​ ​1920​ ​was​ ​the​ ​elimination​ ​of 
“trick​ ​pitches”​ ​such​ ​as​ ​spitballs,​ ​or​ ​mudballs.​ ​This​ ​rule​ ​would​ ​evolve​ ​to​ ​allow​ ​registered 
spitballers​ ​to​ ​be​ ​grandfathered​ ​in​ ​to​ ​continue​ ​to​ ​be​ ​allowed​ ​to​ ​throw​ ​such​ ​pitches.​ ​Though​ ​these 
rules​ ​have​ ​had​ ​long​ ​term​ ​effects​ ​on​ ​the​ ​level​ ​of​ ​offensive​ ​production​ ​since​ ​their​ ​1920’s 
conception,​ ​one​ ​key​ ​change​ ​to​ ​the​ ​game​ ​of​ ​baseball​ ​was​ ​fundamental​ ​when​ ​looking​ ​to​ ​the​ ​cause 
of​ ​the​ ​1920’s​ ​power​ ​boom:​ ​the​ ​baseball.  
The​ ​“Live​ ​Ball”​ ​era​ ​of​ ​baseball​ ​began​ ​in​ ​1920​ ​when​ ​baseball​ ​manufacturers​ ​began 
importing​ ​a​ ​higher​ ​quality​ ​wool​ ​from​ ​Australia,​ ​allowing​ ​the​ ​baseballs​ ​to​ ​be​ ​more​ ​tightly​ ​wound. 
This​ ​change​ ​in​ ​the​ ​manufacturing​ ​process​ ​made​ ​the​ ​balls​ ​more​ ​elastic​ ​and​ ​thus​ ​allowed​ ​them​ ​to 
travel​ ​farther.​ ​This​ ​new​ ​baseball​ ​resulted​ ​in​ ​the​ ​home​ ​run​ ​production​ ​rate​ ​more​ ​than​ ​doubling​ ​in 
just​ ​ten​ ​years​ ​from​ ​1920​ ​to​ ​1930​ ​(Vincent,​ ​2006). 
​ ​​Similar​ ​to​ ​1920,​ ​2015​ ​saw​ ​a​ ​several​ ​rule​ ​changes​ ​prior​ ​to​ ​the​ ​start​ ​of​ ​the​ ​season. 
However,​ ​where​ ​the​ ​1920’s​ ​rule​ ​changes​ ​were​ ​specifically​ ​designed​ ​to​ ​increase​ ​offensive 
production,​ ​2015’s​ ​rule​ ​changes​ ​were​ ​focused​ ​primarily​ ​on​ ​increasing​ ​the​ ​pace​ ​of​ ​play.​ ​This 
contrasts​ ​the​ ​previously​ ​mentioned​ ​rule​ ​change​ ​in​ ​1969​ ​that​ ​lowered​ ​the​ ​mound​ ​in​ ​an​ ​explicit 
effort​ ​to​ ​increase​ ​offense.​ ​The​ ​efforts​ ​to​ ​increase​ ​the​ ​pace​ ​of​ ​play​ ​were​ ​done​ ​by​ ​adding​ ​a​ ​clock​ ​to 
que​ ​hitters​ ​and​ ​pitchers​ ​alike​ ​as​ ​to​ ​when​ ​an​ ​at-bat​ ​is​ ​to​ ​begin​ ​(similarly​ ​to​ ​a​ ​play​ ​clock​ ​in 
football).​ ​Players​ ​would​ ​also​ ​allegedly​ ​be​ ​fined​ ​if​ ​they​ ​removed​ ​both​ ​feet​ ​from​ ​the​ ​batter’s​ ​box 
 during​ ​an​ ​at-bat,​ ​though​ ​little​ ​evidence​ ​can​ ​be​ ​found​ ​regarding​ ​how​ ​much,​ ​or​ ​how​ ​frequently, 
players​ ​have​ ​been​ ​fined​ ​for​ ​such​ ​offenses.​ ​A​ ​minor​ ​amendment​ ​to​ ​the​ ​existing​ ​instant​ ​replay 
rules​ ​was​ ​also​ ​added,​ ​stating​ ​that​ ​managers​ ​would​ ​no​ ​longer​ ​be​ ​required​ ​to​ ​leave​ ​the​ ​dugout​ ​in 
order​ ​to​ ​challenge​ ​a​ ​play.​ ​Less​ ​specific​ ​to​ ​pace​ ​of​ ​play​ ​alterations,​ ​Major​ ​League​ ​Baseball​ ​did 
increase​ ​the​ ​number​ ​of​ ​challengeable​ ​plays,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​allowing​ ​managers​ ​to​ ​keep​ ​their 
challenges​ ​after​ ​every​ ​overturned​ ​call,​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​the​ ​pre-2015​ ​version​ ​of​ ​the​ ​rule​ ​that​ ​stated 
managers​ ​would​ ​only​ ​keep​ ​their​ ​challenge​ ​after​ ​one​ ​overturned​ ​call​ ​(MLB,​ ​2015).  
​ ​If​ ​one​ ​were​ ​to​ ​disregard​ ​pace​ ​of​ ​play,​ ​then​ ​naturally​ ​another​ ​1920’s​ ​strategy​ ​to​ ​increase 
the​ ​game’s​ ​offense​ ​may​ ​be​ ​presented,​ ​the​ ​ball​ ​itself.​ ​The​ ​issue​ ​of​ ​a​ ​“live​ ​ball”​ ​or​ ​a​ ​“juiced​ ​ball” 
came​ ​into​ ​question​ ​again​ ​when​ ​the​ ​season​ ​of​ ​1987​ ​yielded​ ​unprecedented​ ​production​ ​with​ ​the 
bats.​ ​Infamously​ ​named​ ​the​ ​“Rabbit​ ​Ball​ ​Year”,​ ​the​ ​conspiracy​ ​of​ ​a​ ​juiced​ ​ball​ ​gained​ ​so​ ​much 
steam​ ​that​ ​the​ ​MLB​ ​conducted​ ​their​ ​own​ ​internal​ ​tests​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​whether​ ​or​ ​not​ ​their 
baseballs​ ​had​ ​been​ ​tampered​ ​with​ ​in​ ​the​ ​hopes​ ​of​ ​increased​ ​offense​ ​output.​ ​Not​ ​surprisingly, 
despite​ ​the​ ​unusually​ ​high​ ​level​ ​of​ ​offense,​ ​the​ ​MLB​ ​concluded​ ​that​ ​there​ ​was​ ​nothing​ ​unusual, 
or​ ​“juiced”​ ​about​ ​the​ ​baseballs​ ​at​ ​that​ ​time​ ​(Moore,​ ​2016).  
In​ ​what​ ​is​ ​the​ ​most​ ​contemporary​ ​examination​ ​of​ ​the​ ​MLB’s​ ​possible​ ​attempt​ ​to​ ​increase 
offense,​ ​Lindbergh​ ​and​ ​Lichtman​ ​(2017)​ ​mention​ ​that​ ​in​ ​2015,​ ​Rob​ ​Manfred​ ​took​ ​the​ ​reigns​ ​as 
MLB​ ​Commissioner​ ​from​ ​Bud​ ​Selig.​ ​By​ ​the​ ​time​ ​the​ ​second​ ​half​ ​of​ ​the​ ​2015​ ​season​ ​rolled 
around​ ​in​ ​mid-July,​ ​Manfred​ ​had​ ​implemented​ ​a​ ​new​ ​baseball,​ ​altered​ ​slightly​ ​to​ ​accommodate 
his​ ​signature​ ​that​ ​was​ ​larger​ ​than​ ​Bud​ ​Selig’s.​ ​While​ ​this​ ​change​ ​was​ ​allegedly​ ​only​ ​cosmetic, 
there​ ​is​ ​no​ ​denying​ ​that​ ​in​ ​the​ ​second​ ​half​ ​of​ ​the​ ​season,​ ​offensive​ ​production​ ​increased 
intensely.​ ​Strikingly​ ​similar​ ​to​ ​1987,​ ​the​ ​MLB​ ​conducted​ ​yet​ ​another​ ​internal​ ​investigation​ ​to 
 determine​ ​if​ ​the​ ​Manfred​ ​baseball​ ​was​ ​indeed​ ​made​ ​to​ ​launch.​ ​Again,​ ​similarly​ ​to​ ​1987,​ ​in​ ​2015 
the​ ​BRC​ ​and​ ​MLB​ ​alike​ ​both​ ​determined​ ​that​ ​not​ ​only​ ​were​ ​the​ ​baseballs​ ​not​ ​juiced,​ ​but​ ​they 
were​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​95%​ ​confident​ ​that​ ​the​ ​results​ ​were​ ​comparable​ ​to​ ​previous​ ​compliance​ ​data 
(Lichtman​ ​&​ ​Lindbergh,​ ​2017).  
Still,​ ​another​ ​possible​ ​explanation​ ​for​ ​the​ ​increased​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​home​ ​runs​ ​specifically​ ​that 
many​ ​scholars​ ​point​ ​to​ ​is​ ​the​ ​“new​ ​age”​ ​style​ ​of​ ​hitting​ ​where​ ​emphasis​ ​is​ ​placed​ ​on​ ​fly​ ​balls.​ ​In 
theory,​ ​more​ ​fly​ ​balls​ ​would​ ​translate​ ​to​ ​more​ ​home​ ​runs​ ​given​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​a​ ​ball​ ​must​ ​have 
certain​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​loft​ ​to​ ​carry​ ​enough​ ​distance​ ​to​ ​get​ ​over​ ​the​ ​fence.​ ​This​ ​would​ ​explain​ ​the 
dramatic​ ​increase​ ​in​ ​home​ ​runs,​ ​if​ ​more​ ​fly​ ​balls​ ​were​ ​in​ ​fact​ ​being​ ​hit.​ ​In​ ​reality,​ ​2015​ ​actually 
saw​ ​a​ ​lower​ ​percent​ ​of​ ​fly​ ​balls​ ​hit​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​2014​ ​(Fangraphs,​ ​2017).  
Further,​ ​Lickman​ ​and​ ​Lindbergh​ ​(2017)​ ​they​ ​make​ ​considerable​ ​note​ ​that​ ​in​ ​addition​ ​to 
the​ ​Baseball​ ​Research​ ​Center​ ​and​ ​MLB’s​ ​independent​ ​study,​ ​Washington​ ​State​ ​University 
conducted​ ​their​ ​own​ ​study​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​if​ ​the​ ​coefficient​ ​of​ ​restitution​ ​(COR)​ ​measurements, 
essentially​ ​a​ ​measure​ ​of​ ​a​ ​baseball’s​ ​bounciness,​ ​were​ ​truly​ ​different.​ ​The​ ​study​ ​found​ ​that 
Manfred’s​ ​new​ ​baseball​ ​traveled,​ ​on​ ​average,​ ​and​ ​additional​ ​7.1​ ​feet.​ ​(Lichtman​ ​&​ ​Lindbergh, 
2017). 
Where​ ​the​ ​previous​ ​research​ ​has​ ​provided​ ​substantial​ ​explanation​ ​of​ ​previous​ ​instances 
where​ ​the​ ​MLB​ ​has​ ​made​ ​efforts​ ​to​ ​increase​ ​the​ ​offensive​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​America’s​ ​Pastime,​ ​our​ ​own 




 Using​ ​data​ ​on​ ​pitcher​ ​efficiency​ ​from​ ​2004-2017,​ ​we​ ​ran​ ​one​ ​sample​ ​t-tests​ ​to​ ​determine 
the​ ​likelihood​ ​that​ ​the​ ​2014​ ​data​ ​represented​ ​an​ ​outstanding​ ​year​ ​for​ ​pitching.​ ​We​ ​examined​ ​four 
key​ ​statistics​ ​using​ ​one​ ​sample​ ​t-tests​ ​for​ ​the​ ​20​ ​top​ ​performing​ ​pitchers​ ​and​ ​five​ ​for​ ​top​ ​40 
performing​ ​batters​ ​in​ ​2014​ ​to​ ​see​ ​if​ ​the​ ​same​ ​trends​ ​held​ ​true​ ​for​ ​their​ ​performance​ ​as​ ​was 
generally​ ​seen​ ​in​ ​the​ ​entire​ ​league.  
 
Data 
We​ ​gathered​ ​statistical​ ​data​ ​measuring​ ​league-wide​ ​pitcher​ ​performance​ ​between​ ​2004 
and​ ​2017​ ​in​ ​seven​ ​key​ ​areas​ ​-​ ​ERA,​ ​R/G,​ ​HR,​ ​WHIP,​ ​AVG,​ ​OPS,​ ​and​ ​BB/G,​ ​-​ ​from 
baseballreference.com.​ ​The​ ​league-wide​ ​data​ ​gathered​ ​begins​ ​in​ ​2004​ ​in​ ​order​ ​to​ ​best​ ​reflect​ ​the 
period​ ​of​ ​statistical​ ​honesty​ ​that​ ​follows​ ​the​ ​“Steroid​ ​Era”​ ​of​ ​the​ ​early,​ ​to​ ​mid-2000’s;​ ​which 
included​ ​offensive​ ​production​ ​that​ ​skyrocketed​ ​as​ ​a​ ​result​ ​of​ ​illegal​ ​use​ ​of​ ​performance 
enhancing​ ​drugs.​ ​Additional​ ​data​ ​examined​ ​included​ ​data​ ​from​ ​the​ ​top​ ​20​ ​pitchers​ ​and​ ​top​ ​40 
hitters​ ​of​ ​2014​ ​as​ ​determined​ ​by​ ​WAR​ ​to​ ​determine​ ​whether​ ​trends​ ​for​ ​all​ ​players​ ​had​ ​an​ ​equal 




Earned​ ​runs​ ​represent​ ​runs​ ​charged​ ​to​ ​the​ ​pitcher​ ​scaled​ ​to​ ​nine​ ​innings​ ​pitched​ ​and​ ​is​ ​an 
indicator​ ​of​ ​pitcher​ ​efficiency​ ​(see​ ​Figure​ ​1). 
 
 
 Figure​ ​1:​ ​Earned​ ​Run​ ​Average,​ ​2004-2017 
 
One​ ​sample​ ​t-tests​ ​(p​ ​<​ ​0.0001)​ ​indicated​ ​a​ ​significant​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​ERA​ ​in​ ​2014 
compared​ ​to​ ​the​ ​2004-2017​ ​sample.  
On-base​ ​plus​ ​slugging​ ​percentage​ ​is​ ​yet​ ​another​ ​way​ ​to​ ​examine​ ​whether​ ​batters​ ​make​ ​it 
on​ ​base​ ​along​ ​with​ ​slugging​ ​as​ ​a​ ​percentage​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​scaled​ ​by​ ​innings​ ​(see​ ​Figure​ ​2).  
Figure​ ​2:​ ​On​ ​Base​ ​plus​ ​Slugging​ ​Percentage,​ ​2004-2017
 
 One​ ​sample​ ​t-tests​ ​(p​ ​<​ ​0.0001)​ ​indicated​ ​a​ ​significant​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​OPS​ ​in​ ​2014 
compared​ ​to​ ​the​ ​2004-2017​ ​sample.  
Total​ ​home​ ​runs​ ​measure​ ​how​ ​often​ ​the​ ​ball​ ​is​ ​being​ ​hit​ ​out​ ​of​ ​the​ ​ball​ ​park,​ ​a​ ​moment 
when​ ​the​ ​batter​ ​completely​ ​bests​ ​the​ ​pitcher​ ​(see​ ​Figure​ ​3).  
Figure​ ​3:​ ​Home​ ​Runs,​ ​2004-2017 
 
One​ ​sample​ ​t-tests​ ​(p​ ​<​ ​0.0001)​ ​indicated​ ​a​ ​significant​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​HR​ ​in​ ​2014 
compared​ ​to​ ​the​ ​2004-2017​ ​sample.​ ​A​ ​time​ ​series​ ​analysis​ ​shows​ ​a​ ​break​ ​in​ ​the​ ​data​ ​between 
2014​ ​and​ ​2015.  
Runs​ ​per​ ​game​ ​is​ ​another​ ​way​ ​to​ ​examine​ ​pitcher​ ​efficiency​ ​through​ ​how​ ​many​ ​runs​ ​are 






 Figure​ ​4:​ ​Runs/Game,​ ​2004-2017 
 
One​ ​sample​ ​t-tests​ ​(p​ ​<​ ​0.0001)​ ​indicated​ ​a​ ​significant​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​HR/Hit​ ​Allowed​ ​in 
2014​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​the​ ​2004-2017​ ​sample.  
The​ ​home​ ​run​ ​to​ ​hit​ ​allowed​ ​ratio​ ​offers​ ​further​ ​detail​ ​of​ ​pitcher​ ​efficiency​ ​as​ ​it 
represents​ ​home​ ​runs​ ​as​ ​a​ ​proportion​ ​of​ ​total​ ​hits​ ​allowed​ ​(see​ ​Figure​ ​5).  
Figure​ ​5:​ ​Home​ ​Runs​ ​per​ ​Hits​ ​Allowed,​ ​2004-2017 
 
 One​ ​sample​ ​t-tests​ ​(p​ ​<​ ​0.0001)​ ​indicated​ ​a​ ​significant​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​HR/Hit​ ​Allowed​ ​in 
2014​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​the​ ​2004-2017​ ​sample.​ ​Moreover,​ ​the​ ​graph​ ​shows​ ​the​ ​same​ ​trend​ ​of​ ​steadily 
decreasing​ ​between​ ​2004​ ​and​ ​2014​ ​with​ ​a​ ​reversal​ ​of​ ​this​ ​trend​ ​between​ ​2014​ ​and​ ​2015. 
WHIP​ ​represents​ ​the​ ​walks​ ​and​ ​hits​ ​per​ ​inning​ ​pitched​ ​and​ ​serves​ ​as​ ​yet​ ​another​ ​marker 
of​ ​a​ ​pitcher’s​ ​dominance​ ​over​ ​batters​ ​in​ ​terms​ ​of​ ​keeping​ ​them​ ​off​ ​base​ ​(see​ ​Figure​ ​6). 
Figure​ ​6:​ ​Walks​ ​and​ ​Hits​ ​per​ ​Innings​ ​Pitched,​ ​2004-2017   
 
One​ ​sample​ ​t-tests​ ​(p​ ​<​ ​0.0001)​ ​indicated​ ​a​ ​significant​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​WHIP​ ​in​ ​2014 
compared​ ​to​ ​the​ ​2004-2017​ ​sample.  
Bases​ ​on​ ​balls​ ​per​ ​game​ ​show​ ​how​ ​often​ ​the​ ​runner​ ​is​ ​allowed​ ​on​ ​base​ ​by​ ​the​ ​pitcher’s 
failure​ ​to​ ​throw​ ​strikes​ ​that​ ​the​ ​batter​ ​does​ ​not​ ​swing​ ​at.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​also​ ​a​ ​measure​ ​of​ ​the​ ​plate 
discipline​ ​of​ ​the​ ​hitters​ ​(see​ ​Figure​ ​7). 
 Figure​ ​7:​ ​Bases​ ​on​ ​Balls​ ​per​ ​Game,​ ​2004-2017
 
One​ ​sample​ ​t-tests​ ​(p​ ​<​ ​0.0001)​ ​indicated​ ​a​ ​significant​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​BB​ ​in​ ​2014 
compared​ ​to​ ​the​ ​2004-2017​ ​sample.  
There​ ​are​ ​several​ ​factors​ ​to​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​that​ ​cannot​ ​account​ ​for​ ​either​ ​the​ ​anomaly​ ​of 
2014​ ​or​ ​the​ ​reversal​ ​of​ ​the​ ​trends​ ​favoring​ ​pitching​ ​in​ ​2015. 
The​ ​only​ ​ballpark​ ​to​ ​change​ ​its​ ​dimensions​ ​in​ ​2015​ ​was​ ​Citi​ ​Field,​ ​bringing​ ​in​ ​the​ ​right 
field​ ​fence​ ​by​ ​10​ ​feet;​ ​while​ ​this​ ​did​ ​result​ ​in​ ​38​ ​additional​ ​home​ ​runs,​ ​it​ ​represents​ ​only​ ​5%​ ​of 
the​ ​723​ ​run​ ​increase​ ​in​ ​2015​ ​and​ ​the​ ​additional​ ​701​ ​in​ ​2016.​ ​Admittedly,​ ​this​ ​change​ ​in 
dimensions​ ​was​ ​brought​ ​about​ ​due​ ​to​ ​analytics​ ​which​ ​suggested​ ​this​ ​shift​ ​would​ ​result​ ​in​ ​more 
home​ ​runs​ ​for​ ​the​ ​Mets​ ​(Rohan,​ ​2014).​ ​While​ ​changing​ ​dimensions​ ​of​ ​ballparks​ ​to​ ​increase 
offensive​ ​production​ ​for​ ​the​ ​home​ ​team​ ​may​ ​be​ ​the​ ​next​ ​frontier​ ​in​ ​analytics,​ ​this​ ​cannot​ ​explain 
the​ ​offensive​ ​explosion​ ​of​ ​2015.​ ​Likewise,​ ​Marlins​ ​Park​ ​was​ ​adjusted​ ​to​ ​create​ ​more​ ​offense, 
bringing​ ​in​ ​the​ ​center​ ​field​ ​fence​ ​by​ ​11​ ​feet​ ​and​ ​lowering​ ​walls​ ​(Frisaro,​ ​2015).​ ​In​ ​2017,​ ​the 
Braves​ ​moved​ ​from​ ​Turner​ ​Field​ ​to​ ​the​ ​newly​ ​opened​ ​SunTrust​ ​Park.​ ​The​ ​dimensions​ ​of 
SunTrust​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​Turner​ ​Field​ ​are​ ​5​ ​feet​ ​shorter​ ​in​ ​left​ ​center,​ ​15​ ​feet​ ​shorter​ ​in​ ​right​ ​center, 
 and​ ​5​ ​feet​ ​closer​ ​in​ ​the​ ​right​ ​field​ ​corner​ ​with​ ​the​ ​decreased​ ​dimensions​ ​of​ ​right​ ​field 
compensated​ ​for​ ​by​ ​a​ ​seven​ ​and​ ​a​ ​half​ ​foot​ ​higher​ ​wall.  
Some​ ​pundits​ ​have​ ​suggested​ ​that​ ​the​ ​increasing​ ​number​ ​of​ ​home​ ​runs​ ​in​ ​2015,​ ​2016,​ ​and 
2017​ ​can​ ​be​ ​attributed​ ​to​ ​hitters​ ​catching​ ​up​ ​to​ ​the​ ​increasing​ ​velocity​ ​of​ ​pitchers.​ ​To​ ​examine 
this​ ​theory,​ ​home​ ​runs​ ​as​ ​a​ ​percentage​ ​of​ ​pitch​ ​type​ ​are​ ​examined​ ​(see​ ​Table​ ​1). 
Table​ ​1:​ ​Home​ ​Runs​ ​as​ ​a​ ​Percentage​ ​of​ ​Pitch​ ​Type,​ ​2009-2017 
 Fastball​ ​HR Slider​ ​HR Changeup​ ​HR Sinker​ ​HR Curve​ ​Ball​ ​HR 
2017 0.8908% 0.8095% 0.9129% 0.8375% 0.6235% 
2016 0.8325% 0.7669% 0.8583% 0.7316% 0.5887% 
2015 0.7483% 0.6356% 0.7391% 0.6769% 0.5548% 
2014 0.6217% 0.5858% 0.6736% 0.5461% 0.4827% 
2013 0.7017% 0.6484% 0.7273% 0.5875% 0.4682% 
2012 0.7422% 0.6808% 0.8068% 0.6519% 0.4978% 
2011 0.6745% 0.6279% 0.7089% 0.6515% 0.4152% 
2010 0.6828% 0.6025% 0.7132% 0.6252% 0.5350% 
2009 0.7653% 0.6541% 0.7571% 0.6725% 0.4845% 
In​ ​2015,​ ​2016,​ ​and​ ​2017,​ ​there​ ​are​ ​increases​ ​in​ ​the​ ​percentage​ ​hit​ ​in​ ​every​ ​pitch​ ​type;​ ​the 
increase​ ​is​ ​not​ ​limited​ ​to​ ​fast​ ​balls.​ ​One-sample​ ​t-tests​ ​reveal​ ​that​ ​2017​ ​was​ ​a​ ​statistically 
significant​ ​anomalous​ ​year​ ​for​ ​every​ ​pitch​ ​type:​ ​fastball​ ​(p<0.0006),​ ​slider​ ​(p<0.004),​ ​changeup 
(p<0.0005),​ ​sinker​ ​(p<.0003),​ ​and​ ​curveball​ ​(p<0.0011). 
Data​ ​regarding​ ​the​ ​percentage​ ​of​ ​home​ ​runs​ ​per​ ​fly​ ​ball​ ​thrown​ ​do​ ​not​ ​mirror​ ​the​ ​trends 
seen​ ​in​ ​the​ ​other​ ​data.​ ​The​ ​increase​ ​in​ ​2015,​ ​2016,​ ​and​ ​2017​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​balls​ ​are​ ​traveling 
farther​ ​(see​ ​Figure​ ​8). 
Figure​ ​8:​ ​Home​ ​Run/Fly​ ​Ball​ ​Percentage,​ ​2004-2017 
  
 
Interestingly,​ ​the​ ​swinging​ ​strike​ ​percentage​ ​has​ ​also​ ​been​ ​trending​ ​upward​ ​every​ ​year 
since​ ​2010​ ​(see​ ​Figure​ ​9).​ ​The​ ​data​ ​does​ ​not​ ​follow​ ​the​ ​same​ ​trend​ ​negating​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​that 
batters​ ​began​ ​offering​ ​at​ ​more​ ​pitches​ ​since​ ​2014;​ ​likewise,​ ​strikeouts​ ​have​ ​increased​ ​steadily 
since​ ​2005​ ​(see​ ​Figure​ ​10). 
Figure​ ​9:​ ​Swinging​ ​Strike​ ​Percentage,​ ​2004-2016 
 
Figure​ ​10:​ ​Strikeouts​ ​Percentage,​ ​2004-2017 
  
To​ ​examine​ ​whether​ ​the​ ​trends​ ​seen​ ​across​ ​all​ ​of​ ​Major​ ​League​ ​Baseball​ ​hold​ ​true​ ​for​ ​the 
top​ ​performing​ ​pitchers,​ ​AVG,​ ​WHIP,​ ​ERA,​ ​and​ ​HR/9​ ​data​ ​was​ ​collected​ ​for​ ​the​ ​top​ ​20​ ​pitchers 
of​ ​2014​ ​as​ ​determined​ ​by​ ​WAR​ ​values​ ​(see​ ​Table​ ​2).  
Table​ ​2:​ ​Top​ ​20​ ​Pitchers​ ​of​ ​2014​ ​Performance,​ ​2014-2017 
 AVG WHIP ERA HR/9 
2014 .229 1.09 2.77 .654 
2015 .235 1.17 3.23 .904 
2016 .238 1.18 3.56 1.075 
2017 .232 1.17 3.66 1.132 
This​ ​data​ ​reveals​ ​negligible​ ​increases​ ​in​ ​opponent​ ​AVG​ ​(and​ ​WHIP​ ​suggesting 
consistency​ ​in​ ​these​ ​elite​ ​pitchers’​ ​effectiveness​ ​based​ ​on​ ​one​ ​sample​ ​t-tests.​ ​However,​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a 
marked​ ​increase​ ​in​ ​ERA​ ​(p​ ​<​ ​0.0314)​ ​and​ ​HR/9​ ​(p​ ​<​ ​0.0305)​ ​within​ ​this​ ​group​ ​of​ ​elite​ ​pitchers 
that​ ​is​ ​likely​ ​not​ ​due​ ​to​ ​chance​ ​fluctuations​ ​from​ ​one​ ​season​ ​to​ ​the​ ​next.  
 Similarly,​ ​to​ ​examine​ ​whether​ ​the​ ​trends​ ​seen​ ​across​ ​all​ ​of​ ​Major​ ​League​ ​Baseball​ ​hold 
true​ ​for​ ​the​ ​top​ ​performing​ ​hitters,​ ​AVG,​ ​OBP,​ ​OPS,​ ​HR,​ ​and​ ​SO​ ​data​ ​were​ ​collected​ ​for​ ​the​ ​top 
40​ ​hitters​ ​of​ ​2014​ ​as​ ​determined​ ​by​ ​WAR​ ​values​ ​(see​ ​Table​ ​3).  
Table​ ​3:​ ​Top​ ​40​ ​Hitters​ ​of​ ​2014,​ ​2014-2017 
 AVG OBP OPS HR SO 
2014 0.291 0.362 0.833 20.10 106.38 
2015 0.275 0.344 0.797 18.45 93.38 
2016 0.270 0.344 0.792 20.63 104.35 
2017 0.267 0.349 0.792 19.45 90.58 
Data​ ​from​ ​the​ ​hitters​ ​does​ ​not​ ​show​ ​the​ ​same​ ​trends​ ​as​ ​the​ ​data​ ​from​ ​the​ ​pitchers.​ ​In​ ​fact, 
it​ ​shows​ ​slight​ ​decreases​ ​which​ ​may​ ​well​ ​be​ ​due​ ​to​ ​chance​ ​based​ ​on​ ​one-sample​ ​t-tests  
 
Discussion 
 The​ ​data​ ​shows​ ​a​ ​clear​ ​trend​ ​between​ ​2004-2014​ ​of​ ​increasing​ ​pitcher​ ​dominance.​ ​This 
trend​ ​is​ ​abruptly​ ​reversed​ ​in​ ​2015,​ ​most​ ​remarkably​ ​in​ ​the​ ​category​ ​of​ ​home​ ​runs.  
 Certain​ ​explanations​ ​can​ ​be​ ​dismissed​ ​based​ ​on​ ​the​ ​data​ ​available.​ ​​ ​The​ ​changing 
dimensions​ ​of​ ​the​ ​two​ ​ballparks,​ ​Citi​ ​Field​ ​and​ ​Marlins​ ​Park,​ ​and​ ​switch​ ​from​ ​Turner​ ​Field​ ​to 
SunTrust​ ​Park,​ ​are​ ​not​ ​sufficient​ ​to​ ​explain​ ​the​ ​offensive​ ​increases​ ​of​ ​the​ ​past​ ​three​ ​seasons.​ ​This 
leads​ ​to​ ​look​ ​to​ ​the​ ​plausible​ ​explanations​ ​based​ ​on​ ​previous​ ​increases​ ​in​ ​offense.​ ​​ ​Historically, 
home​ ​runs​ ​have​ ​increased​ ​for​ ​three​ ​reasons:​ ​rule​ ​change,​ ​use​ ​of​ ​steroids,​ ​and​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​the 
baseball​ ​itself.  
There​ ​have​ ​been​ ​no​ ​rule​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​2015,​ ​2016,​ ​and​ ​2017​ ​that​ ​would​ ​increase​ ​offense​ ​as 
rule​ ​changes​ ​pertained​ ​to​ ​pace​ ​of​ ​play. 
 Major​ ​League​ ​Baseball​ ​only​ ​releases​ ​results​ ​results​ ​of​ ​failed​ ​steroid​ ​exams.​ ​Details​ ​of 
which​ ​players​ ​are​ ​tested​ ​and​ ​what​ ​the​ ​test​ ​specifically​ ​screens​ ​for​ ​are​ ​not​ ​released.​ ​Given​ ​the 
sudden​ ​improvement​ ​in​ ​hitting​ ​performance,​ ​performance​ ​enhancing​ ​substances​ ​as​ ​an 
explanation​ ​cannot​ ​be​ ​dismissed​ ​out​ ​of​ ​hand.​ ​Fewer​ ​players​ ​have​ ​been​ ​suspended​ ​for​ ​failed 
testing​ ​between​ ​2015-2017​ ​than​ ​between​ ​2012-2014​ ​(Verducci,​ ​2017).​ ​​ ​However,​ ​insufficient 
data​ ​is​ ​available​ ​to​ ​make​ ​any​ ​claims​ ​beyond​ ​commenting​ ​that​ ​this​ ​is​ ​a​ ​possible​ ​explanation​ ​for 
the​ ​significant​ ​increase​ ​in​ ​offense. 
Measures​ ​of​ ​plate​ ​discipline​ ​-​ ​bases​ ​on​ ​balls,​ ​swinging​ ​strikes​ ​percentage,​ ​and​ ​strikeouts​ ​- 
do​ ​not​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​there​ ​has​ ​been​ ​an​ ​increase​ ​in​ ​batters’​ ​skills​ ​in​ ​this​ ​area.​ ​Given​ ​that​ ​plate 
discipline​ ​does​ ​not​ ​seem​ ​to​ ​be​ ​increasing,​ ​the​ ​bases​ ​on​ ​balls​ ​coupled​ ​with​ ​increasing​ ​home​ ​runs 
and​ ​earned​ ​runs​ ​suggests​ ​pitcher​ ​control​ ​is​ ​decreasing.​ ​Such​ ​a​ ​statistically​ ​significant​ ​shift​ ​in 
pitcher​ ​control​ ​is​ ​likely​ ​not​ ​due​ ​to​ ​an​ ​overall​ ​decrease​ ​in​ ​pitching​ ​skill.​ ​Home​ ​runs​ ​are​ ​up​ ​on 
every​ ​pitch​ ​type​ ​so​ ​increased​ ​velocity​ ​is​ ​not​ ​a​ ​likely​ ​explanation. 
The​ ​performance​ ​of​ ​the​ ​top​ ​20​ ​pitchers​ ​of​ ​2014​ ​is​ ​illuminating​ ​as​ ​to​ ​the​ ​changes​ ​that​ ​have 
occurred.​ ​Their​ ​opponent​ ​average​ ​and​ ​WHIP​ ​have​ ​remained​ ​steady​ ​but​ ​there​ ​was​ ​been​ ​a 
statistically​ ​significant​ ​increase​ ​in​ ​their​ ​ERA​ ​and​ ​HR/9.​ ​They​ ​remain​ ​equally​ ​effective​ ​at​ ​keeping 
the​ ​ball​ ​out​ ​of​ ​play;​ ​the​ ​only​ ​difference​ ​is​ ​that​ ​the​ ​balls​ ​are​ ​travelling​ ​out​ ​of​ ​the​ ​park​ ​(ie.​ ​they​ ​are 
travelling​ ​a​ ​greater​ ​distance).​ ​The​ ​Washington​ ​State​ ​University​ ​study​ ​that​ ​suggested​ ​that​ ​the​ ​new 
baseballs,​ ​on​ ​average,​ ​travelled​ ​an​ ​additional​ ​7.1​ ​feet,​ ​could​ ​explain​ ​this​ ​phenomenon. 
Additionally,​ ​the​ ​top​ ​40​ ​hitters​ ​of​ ​2014​ ​actually​ ​show​ ​a​ ​non-significant​ ​decrease​ ​in​ ​performance 
between​ ​2014​ ​and​ ​2017.  
 Given​ ​the​ ​shift​ ​in​ ​the​ ​numbers,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​not​ ​possible​ ​to​ ​ignore​ ​what​ ​the​ ​players,​ ​particularly 
the​ ​pitchers,​ ​are​ ​saying.​ ​Cy​ ​Young​ ​winning​ ​pitcher​ ​Justin​ ​Verlander​ ​stated,​ ​​“So​ ​on​ ​one​ ​hand​ ​you 
can​ ​have​ ​somebody​ ​say​ ​that​ ​manufactures​ ​the​ ​ball,​ ​they’re​ ​not​ ​different.​ ​And​ ​on​ ​the​ ​other​ ​hand 
you​ ​can​ ​say​ ​that​ ​the​ ​people​ ​that​ ​have​ ​held​ ​a​ ​ball​ ​in​ ​their​ ​hand​ ​their​ ​entire​ ​life,​ ​saying​ ​it’s 
different,​ ​you​ ​value​ ​one​ ​over​ ​the​ ​other.​ ​You​ ​take​ ​your​ ​pick.​ ​(Kernan,​ ​2017).​ ​​While​ ​Rawlings 
does​ ​insist​ ​that​ ​they​ ​continue​ ​to​ ​manufacture​ ​the​ ​balls​ ​within​ ​the​ ​specified​ ​parameters,​ ​this​ ​does 
not​ ​preclude​ ​a​ ​shift​ ​in​ ​the​ ​average.​ ​That​ ​is​ ​to​ ​say​ ​it​ ​is​ ​possible​ ​for​ ​a​ ​ball​ ​to​ ​still​ ​fall​ ​within​ ​the 
acceptable​ ​parameters​ ​can​ ​still​ ​favor​ ​one​ ​end​ ​of​ ​the​ ​spectrum​ ​such​ ​that​ ​it​ ​will​ ​travel​ ​further.  
 
​ ​​Conclusion 
Having​ ​examined​ ​multiple​ ​possible​ ​explanations,​ ​the​ ​historical​ ​record​ ​offers​ ​the​ ​best 
potential​ ​explanations​ ​for​ ​what​ ​is​ ​clearly​ ​and​ ​offensive​ ​surge​ ​with​ ​the​ ​increase​ ​in​ ​homeruns 
being​ ​most​ ​notable.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​no​ ​secret​ ​that​ ​the​ ​Commissioner​ ​of​ ​Baseball​ ​has​ ​made​ ​increased​ ​offense 
a​ ​goal.​ ​The​ ​data​ ​supports​ ​that​ ​offense​ ​has​ ​increased​ ​in​ ​ways​ ​not​ ​due​ ​to​ ​changes​ ​in​ ​rules​ ​or 
dimensions.​ ​This​ ​leaves​ ​the​ ​explanations​ ​of​ ​steroid​ ​usage​ ​or​ ​a​ ​change​ ​in​ ​the​ ​composition​ ​of​ ​the 
baseballs.  
Ultimately,​ ​Major​ ​League​ ​Baseball​ ​can​ ​choose​ ​to​ ​make​ ​changes​ ​to​ ​promote​ ​offense​ ​in 
order​ ​to​ ​make​ ​the​ ​sport​ ​more​ ​marketable​ ​and​ ​appeal​ ​to​ ​a​ ​larger​ ​audience.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​past,​ ​these 
changes​ ​have​ ​been​ ​made​ ​with​ ​transparency.​ ​It​ ​is​ ​not​ ​necessarily​ ​wrong​ ​to​ ​alter​ ​the​ ​baseball​ ​to 
promote​ ​offense​ ​but​ ​if​ ​such​ ​a​ ​change​ ​has​ ​occurred,​ ​there​ ​are​ ​significant​ ​implication​ ​for​ ​teams.​ ​To 
remain​ ​competitive,​ ​they​ ​will​ ​need​ ​to​ ​change​ ​their​ ​approach​ ​in​ ​building​ ​a​ ​team.​ ​Alternately, 
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